REFORM OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT AS A BASIS REFORMING RELATIONS OF PROPERTY IN UKRAINE

Abstract

Introduction. The processes of property ownership reform entered into an active phase inUkraine in 1992. They were aimed, above all, at overcoming the monopoly of state ownership, resuscitation of private ownership and achieving real pluralism of different forms of ownership. However, the transformations in the area of property relations were characterized by numerous conflicts and abuses, which gave rise to a number of problems that need to be addressed.

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to assess the key areas of the reform of state property management in the context of property ownership reform and to substantiate ways to increase the efficiency of public sector enterprises in the Ukrainian economy.

Results. The evaluation and substantiation of concrete proposals within the framework of the main directions of the reform of management of state enterprises, in particular such as: improvement of corporate governance, are given; review of the principles and mechanisms of corporate governance by state banks; the introduction of a transparent process for the appointment of heads of state enterprises and the establishment of the market level of their wages; training managers of major state-owned enterprises; definition of clear goals of state enterprises activity, division of commercial and non-profit functions; increase of efficiency of state enterprises; introduction of property policy; introduction of advanced world practices in the sale of state-owned enterprises; corporatization of state-owned objects; restructuring and reorganization of business entities. Several areas of reformation of property relations that are not foreseen by the reform are allocated, namely: optimization of the share of state property; return of the controlling block of shares to strategically important enterprises; application of procedures for re-privatization and nationalization; formation of an effective shareholder mechanism.

Originality. In contrast to the official (government) position, an attempt has been made to prove that: 1) the effectiveness of the supervision of the National Bank of Ukraine in the activities of banks, including public ones, is low; 2) the size of salaries of heads of large state enterprises is unreasonably overestimated; 3) state enterprises should clearly distinguish between commercial and non-commercial (social) functions; 4) the ineffectiveness of state-owned enterprises (as a prerequisite for their privatization) can only be said when they are cleared of corruption-related individuals and innovatively enriched; 5) the strategic vision of the government regarding the division of state enterprises into three groups (remaining in state ownership, which are intended for privatization in the process of reorganization or liquidation) or the so-called "triage" should be reconsidered in favor of the enterprises of the first group; 6) sale of large privatization objects with the involvement of an investment advisor should be justified from the point of view of national security; 7) all state-owned enterprises (and not only state-owned) should be subordinated to the relevant ministries and departments; 8) the share of state property in Ukraine is critically low; 9) the formation of a socially oriented market economy in Ukraine should take full advantage of the ownership form of ownership.

Conclusion. At first glance, steps and measures for reforming property relations, in particular privatization of state property, are aimed at improving the efficiency of the functioning of the state sector of the economy. But it is possible that, instead of privatization in the context of a socially oriented market economy, we will have a large-scale giper of state ownership by representatives of the kleptocratic authority and the oligarchs approaching them.